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PATENT IMPERIALISM
Bernard Chao*
INTRODUCTION
With a few narrow exceptions, U.S. patent law concerns itself with
activity that either occurs within this country’s borders or crosses its
borders. In the typical case, that means that a patentee can recover lost
profits or reasonable royalties based on the domestic sales of infringing
products. However, patentees have begun to successfully advance a new
and creative approach that this Essay labels the “worldwide causation”
theory. So long as some domestic infringement can be said to cause sales
overseas, patentees argue that there should be no territorial limitation on
their recovery, allowing recovery for damages suffered anywhere in the
world.
This Essay argues that courts should reject this new theory on both
doctrinal and policy grounds. Part I introduces the worldwide causation
theory in the context of patent law principles. Part II contends that, as a
purely doctrinal matter, permitting patentees to recover damages for sales
that take place overseas would circumvent the explicit territorial limitations
that are well established in U.S. patent law. This argument is reinforced by
the general presumption against the extraterritorial application of any U.S.
law.
Part III discusses why the worldwide causation theory of damages also
makes bad international and domestic policy. Under the current
international regime, each nation has its own patent system. This means that
inventors must satisfy a country’s specific patent laws to obtain a patent,
sue for infringement in its courts, and obtain remedies available under that
country’s laws. The proposed worldwide causation theory would undermine
this regime and allow United States patent law to trump laws in other
countries. Of course, other countries could follow suit and exercise their
own forms of “patent imperialism,” thereby wreaking havoc with notions of
territorial sovereignty in patent law. In addition to causing problems abroad,
the worldwide causation theory provides troubling disincentives for U.S.
companies. Companies that locate key activities in the U.S. will be worse
*
Bernard Chao is an Assistant Professor at the University of Denver Sturm College of Law and Of
Counsel to Chao, Hadidi, Stark & Barker LLP (“CHSB”). CHSB represents Marvell in matters unrelated
to the Carnegie Mellon lawsuit discussed here. The opinions expressed here are mine alone and I have
not been compensated for this work. Thanks to Timothy Holbrook, Brian Love, Annecoos Wiersema
and participants of the 2014 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference at the University of California
Berkeley for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.
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off than companies that offshore those activities. In sum, there are ample
reasons to reject patent imperialism.
I.

PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES

A. Extraterritorial Limits
The most common form of patent infringement is direct infringement.
Section 271(a) of the Patent Act defines a direct infringer as someone who
“without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention.”1 It is well established that the reach of § 271(a) is
limited to infringing activities that occur within the United States.2
Traditionally, that has meant that patentees can only recover damages
for infringing products that are made or sold in the United States. For
example, consider a case from the so-called “smartphone wars.” Recently, a
jury found that Samsung’s smartphones and tablets infringed a number of
different Apple patents.3 When arguing over damages, the parties focused
solely on the products Samsung sold in the United States. Specifically,
Apple sought a combination of lost profits and reasonable royalties based
on the sale of 22.7 million infringing tablets and smartphones in the United
States.4 Notably, Apple did not offer evidence of Samsung’s foreign sales
nor did it seek damages based on those sales.
Although there are exceptions to patent law’s territorial limitation,
these exceptions are narrow. For example, under § 271(g), using a patented
process to make a product outside the United States can lead to a charge of
infringement if someone imports the product into the United States or offers

1

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (emphasis added) [http://perma.cc/ZF74-EBYN].
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007) (“The traditional understanding that
our patent law ‘operate[s] only domestically and d[oes] not extend to foreign activities,’ is embedded in
the Patent Act itself, which provides that a patent confers exclusive rights in an invention within the
United States.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The
Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported Software: 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON.
L. 557, 559 (2004))) [http://perma.cc/LG4Q-AFD8]; Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow
Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) (finding patentee not permitted to sue defendants for infringement based
on drills sold in Canada that later made their way into this country) [http://perma.cc/CW5X-BCD9].
3
Nick Wingfield, Jury Awards $1 Billion to Apple in Samsung Patent Case, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/25/technology/jury-reaches-decision-in-apple-samsung-patenttrial.html [http://perma.cc/6TJ6-DEFD]. Although the case involved trade dress and design patents, this
discussion focuses on the utility patent remedies.
4
See Transcript of Proceedings at 183, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 838
(N.D. Cal. August 21, 2012) (C-11-01846 LHK) (Apple’s closing argument on damages only discussing
the 22.7 million infringing phones and tablets Samsung sold in the United States.); Joint Trial Exhibit
No. 1500, Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (No. 11-CV01846-LHK (PSG)) (the parties’ joint exhibit only disclosing Samsung’s U.S. based sales and profit).
2
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to sell, sells, or uses the product within the United States.5 Despite the
statute’s territorial limitation for importing, offering to sell, selling, or
using, § 271(g) was clearly drafted to encompass foreign conduct––namely,
using a patented process outside the United States.6 In other situations, the
courts have interpreted different subsections of § 271(b) to apply to conduct
abroad. Section 271(b)’s inducement provision does not contain the same
territorial limitation found in § 271(a).7 Consequently, courts have found
that conduct outside the United States can qualify as inducement so long as
the conduct serves to induce some direct infringement inside the United
States.8 Similarly, courts have occasionally interpreted the location of where
specific acts of infringement take place very expansively.9 But each of these
exceptions is tied to particular statutory language and only applies to a very
narrow set of circumstances.10
B. Worldwide Causation Theory
Not surprisingly, patentees have attempted to expand their rights by
overcoming patent law’s territorial limitations. A new worldwide causation
based damages theory has now emerged. Patentees are now seeking to
recover damages based on foreign sales because these sales would not have
been made “but for” a defendant’s infringing conduct in the United States.
In Power Integrations v. Fairchild Semiconductor, the patentee sought
to recover lost profits for overseas sales made by the accused infringer.11

5

35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012).
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119,
2139 (2008) (“Absent § 271(g), a competitor could circumvent a U.S. process patent by performing the
process outside of the United States and importing the unpatented product into the United States.”)
[hereinafter Holbrook, Extraterritoriality] [http://perma.cc/94XE-QWC7].
7
See generally Bernard Chao, Reconciling Foreign and Domestic Infringement, 80 UMKC L. REV.
607 (2012) (discussing the unintended consequences of leaving the inducement statute without a
territorial limitation, but requiring such a limitation for direct and contributory infringement)
[http://perma.cc/PH33-JXBJ].
8
Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that inducement does not
have a territorial limitation) [http://perma.cc/5LAY-3A5J].
9
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d 1296,
1309 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that an offer made overseas between two U.S. companies to sell an
infringing product in the U.S. constitutes an offer to sell within the U.S.) [http://perma.cc/QZC5-UT7R];
NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that use of an
infringing system is “where control of the system is exercised and beneficial use of the system
obtained,” not the physical location of the system) [http://perma.cc/QAR7-49D6]. See generally
Timothy R. Holbrook, Territoriality and Tangibility After Transocean, 61 EMORY L.J. 1087 (2012)
[http://perma.cc/KCL2-UZ4T].
10
See generally Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra note 6 (cataloging the various extraterritorial
aspects of U.S. patent law).
11
Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2013) [http://perma.cc/Z5GU-8TRN].
6
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Specifically, Power Integrations presented evidence that customers were
interested in using the same semiconductor chips in their products (power
supplies for electronic devices) everywhere in the world.12 Consequently,
the plaintiff, Power Integrations, argued that but for Fairchild’s U.S.
infringement, Fairchild would not have been able to make its foreign sales;
Power Integrations would have made those sales.13 Relying on this theory,
Power Integrations asked for lost profits based on the sales it lost
worldwide. The Federal Circuit rejected this causation theory, saying that:
We find neither compelling facts nor a reasonable justification for finding that
Power Integrations is entitled to “full compensation” in the form of damages
based on loss of sales in foreign markets which it claims were a foreseeable
result of infringing conduct in the United States. 14

Notwithstanding the decision in Power Integrations, the worldwide
causation theory was recently accepted by the Western District of
Pennsylvania.15 Carnegie Mellon University sued Marvell, a U.S.-based
semiconductor company, for infringing two patents relating to technology
that accurately detects data from computer hard-disk drives.16 In December
2012, Carnegie Mellon prevailed and obtained a $1.17 billion jury verdict.17
The verdict was based on a fifty cent per chip royalty that was applied to all
Marvell’s infringing chips sold throughout the world.18
Unlike those in a typical patent case, Carnegie Mellon’s charges of
infringement did not focus on the manufacture and sale of Marvell’s
infringing chips. This is probably because the infringing chips were
manufactured in Taiwan and then shipped to customer manufacturing sites
in Asia.19 Instead, the conduct at issue was Marvell’s extensive “sales
cycle.” This cycle included: 1) “a 3–6 month period of rigorous evaluation
12
Non-Confidential Brief for Plaintiff-Cross Appellant Power Integrations, Inc. at 20, Power
Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Nos. 20111218, 2011-1238), 2011 WL 2827447 (“The record shows that Samsung did not make country-specific
chargers and would not have bought from Fairchild instead of Power Integrations at all if it were unable
to ship chargers with Fairchild chips into the United States.” (emphasis in original)).
13
Id. at 44.
14
Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1372.
15
Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 2d 574, 638 (W.D. Pa. 2013)
[http://perma.cc/V28B-XK7P].
16
Id. at 581–82.
17
Id. at 582.
18
Id. at 597. The court subsequently granted supplemental damages and enhanced the damages by
1.23 times because of willful infringement. Thus, the total award increased to $1.54 billion. Carnegie
Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd, No. 09-290, 2014 WL 1320154, at *26 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
2014) [http://perma.cc/KB92-638Y].
19
The chips were manufactured at the Taiwan facilities of a foundry belonging to Taiwan
Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. Carnegie Mellon, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 593. Most of Marvell’s
worldwide semiconductor sales occurred outside the United States and were assembled into products
abroad before the end products were imported into the United States. Id. at 594.
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and reliability testing by the customer;” 2) “a 12–18 month development
period;” and 3) “a 3–6 month period before Marvell commences volume
production.”20 During the sales cycle, Marvell used simulators “to formulate
product concepts and to design, refine, and evaluate chip designs.”21 Like
the end products, the simulators used the technology at issue and were
accused of infringing the patents.22 More importantly, Carnegie Mellon
presented evidence that essentially the entire sales cycle took place in Santa
Clara, California, where Marvell is headquartered.23 Thus, unlike any
charges that might be brought for making and selling chips abroad,
§ 271(a)’s territorial limitations did not bar Carnegie Mellon’s accusations
of infringement against “use” of the patented technology during Marvell’s
sales cycle.24
A significant issue with basing allegations of infringement on
Marvell’s sales cycle was how to determine damages. Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (2012), prevailing patentees can recover lost profits or, at a minimum,
a reasonable royalty. As a university, Carnegie Mellon did not make chips
or compete with Marvell. Thus, there were no lost profits and the only form
of money damages that Carnegie Mellon could recover was a reasonable
royalty. In typical patent cases, a reasonable royalty is assessed based on the
number of infringing products that are made or sold. Since Carnegie
Mellon’s infringement allegations focused on Marvell’s sales cycle,
Carnegie Mellon could have sought a royalty based on the number of times
Marvell simulators used the patented technology during the sales cycle. But
the court rejected this method because of the difficulty of determining both
the value of each use and the number of infringing uses.25
Instead, Carnegie Mellon chose to pursue a worldwide causation
theory. Specifically, Carnegie Mellon argued that to achieve “design wins”
Marvell used the patented methods during its sales cycle.26 Since the sales
cycles caused Marvell’s worldwide sales, Carnegie argued that it was

20

Id. at 593.
Id.
22
Id. at 592.
23
Id. at 593.
24
Infringing “uses” are a form of direct infringement under § 271(a), but because end customers
tend to be responsible for such uses, the issue of infringing use comes up more commonly in cases of
indirect infringement where companies are accused of contributing to or inducing customers to use
patented technology. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1320–23 (Fed. Cir.
2009) [http://perma.cc/3FUF-9K8E].
25
Carnegie Mellon, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 636. A royalty could also be based on the number of
infringing “uses.” However, that is not how damages in patent cases have traditionally been calculated.
Moreover, the court considered such a methodology and rejected it as impractical. Id. at 635–36.
26
Id. at 634–35.
21
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entitled to royalty on all those sales.27 The district court accepted the
worldwide theory, distinguishing Power Integrations on two grounds.
First, the district court pointed out that the plaintiff in Power
Integrations was seeking lost profits, not a reasonable royalty.28 Although
that distinction is factually accurate, the court did not explain why
reasonable royalty recoveries should contemplate foreign sales, but
recoveries for lost profits should not. In fact, another district court has
recently rejected this very distinction, saying, “Power Integrations’s
occasional reference to ‘lost profits’ is immaterial to the underlying
principle, which was that a plaintiff is not entitled to damages for patent
infringement that occurred abroad.”29
The Carnegie Mellon court’s second way of distinguishing Power
Integrations is equally puzzling. The district court said that unlike Carnegie
Mellon, the plaintiff in Power Integrations was “seek[ing] ‘damages for
injury caused by infringing activity that occurred outside the territory of the
United States.’”30 But the plaintiff in Power Integrations also relied on
domestic infringement to show foreign damages. Indeed, the Federal Circuit
decision specifically said, “[the plaintiff] argues that it was foreseeable that
Fairchild’s infringement in the United States would cause Power
Integrations to lose sales in foreign markets.”31
Moreover, the Federal Circuit rejected this very theory by saying that
“the entirely extraterritorial production, use, or sale of an invention patented
in the United States is an independent, intervening act that, under almost all
circumstances, cuts off the chain of causation initiated by an act of domestic
infringement.”32
The Northern District of California is the only other court to address
the worldwide causation theory after Power Integrations and it also
interpreted the decision to say that patent law “does not provide damages
[based on foreign sales] for infringement that originates domestically.”33
Indeed, the France Telecom court rejected the inclusion of foreign sales
based on the same Marvell sales cycle, suggesting that Carnegie Mellon
would have turned out differently had Marvell included certain evidence
supporting characterization of the sales as foreign.34 Thus, the Carnegie
27

Id. at 638.
Id.
29
France Telecom S.A. v. Marvell Semiconductor Inc., Case No. 12–cv–04967–WHO, 2014 WL
1478850, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2014) [http://perma.cc/LM53-YVHA].
30
Carnegie Mellon, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (emphasis in original) (quoting Power Integrations, Inc.
v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F.3d 1348, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2013)).
31
Power Integrations, 711 F.3d at 1370 (emphasis added).
32
Id. at 1371–72 (emphasis added).
33
France Telecom, 2014 WL 1478850, at *14.
34
Id. at *17. However, the district court in Carnegie Mellon did appear to understand that Marvell’s
sales were foreign. See note 19 and accompanying text.
28
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Mellon decision plainly fails to follow controlling Federal Circuit
precedent.
C. Causation Roots
To be fair, the worldwide causation theory has some intuitive appeal,
given its similarity to tort causation analysis.35 Patent law has often
discussed damages in terms that sound like tort law, in which damages are
designed to restore the plaintiff to the position it occupied prior to the
offending conduct. For example, the statute on patent damages describes
lost profits as providing “damages adequate to compensate for the
infringement.”36 Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that when
calculating damages “that question [is] primarily: had the Infringer not
infringed, what would Patent Holder-Licensee have made?”37 Of course, the
flip side of this kind of analysis is determining what injury the infringer
“caused.”
Relying on this kind of tort causation analysis, the Federal Circuit has
held that patentees can recover damages for the lost sales of both nonpatented and patented products alike.38 To justify this decision, the Federal
Circuit reasoned that “[i]f a particular injury was or should have been
reasonably foreseeable by an infringing competitor in the relevant market,
broadly defined, that injury is generally compensable absent a persuasive
reason to the contrary.”39 The worldwide causation theory seeks to extend
this foreseeability principle to extraterritorial sales. Patentees can often
point out that a defendant commits infringing acts (most likely “uses”)
when the design team develops the infringing product in this country or
when the sales team shows a customer how to use the product in the United
States. Patentees certainly have the right to seek injunctions to halt those
35

See Thomas F. Cotter, U.S. District Court Awards Carnegie Mellon $1.5 Billion in Patent
Damages,
COMPARATIVE
PATENT
REMEDIES
(Apr.
21
2014,
4:08
AM),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/04/us-district-court-awards-carnegie.html (initially
finding Carnegie’s Mellon’s “but for” approach appealing) [http://perma.cc/AKA5-SV6A]. Later, Cotter
was slightly swayed by the amicus authored by Professor Brian Love in the Carnegie Mellon appeal and
a draft of this essay. Brief Amici Curiae of Fifteen Professors of Intellectual Property Law in Support of
Appellant Marvell, Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., No. 2014-1492 (Fed Cir. Aug.
11, 2014) [http://perma.cc/HVE8-EZGU]; Thomas F. Cotter, Reasonable Royalties Based on
Extraterritorial Sales, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Aug. 13, 2014, 4:35 AM),
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2014/08/reasonable-royalties-based-on.html
[http://perma.cc/XXD4-RLRX].
36
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) [http://perma.cc/727E-DZL4].
37
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964) (alteration in
original) (quoting Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., 251 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1958))
[http://perma.cc/4ASV-RAWM].
38
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546–47 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [http://perma.cc/8GQXNHRY].
39
Id. at 1546; see also Aro Mfg., 377 U.S. at 507.

83

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW ONLINE

acts. Why can’t they also recover damages for the foreseeable result of
those infringing acts, namely overseas sales?40 Superficially, the worldwide
causation theory has some appeal, but the following sections explain why it
misapplies the law and makes for bad policy.
II. DOCTRINAL DIFFICULTIES
Extending patent damages to losses incurred abroad would violate a
basic principle of our country’s laws: the presumption against their
extraterritorial application.41 This presumption is particularly strong in
patent law,42 where the Supreme Court has noted that “[o]ur patent system
makes no claim to extraterritorial effect.”43 The Court has even said that
under the Constitution, Congress does not have the power to enact patent
laws that extend to foreign commerce.44
Relying on this presumption, the Supreme Court has refused to extend
U.S. patent law to circumstances that look very similar to those in Power
Integrations and Carnegie Mellon. In Microsoft v. AT&T, Microsoft had
been sending Windows operating systems to foreign computer
manufacturers by email or by sending a master disk.45 AT&T alleged that
computers equipped with Windows infringed its patent for digitally
encoding and compressing recorded speech.46 Even though the computers
were made abroad, AT&T argued that Microsoft was liable under § 271(f)

40
Commentators, including this one, have criticized this kind of “but for” analysis as antithetical to
patent law’s goal of maximizing innovation. See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum,
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1397 (2014) (“By focusing on restoring patentees to the position they had
prior to any infringement, patent remedies often ignore the public’s interest in encouraging innovation
that builds on existing patented technology.”) [http://perma.cc/7LW6-BJSD]; Ted Sichelman, Purging
Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 536 (2014) (“[The] problem . . . is that
the private law remedies usually associated with tort law—injunctions and compensatory damages—are
not always sensible for optimally encouraging innovation.”) [http://perma.cc/MSV5-YZY2].
41
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013) (“[T]he presumption against
extraterritorial application . . . provides that ‘[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none.’” (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247,
255 (2010))) [http://perma.cc/UQ7A-GCNM].
42
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007) (“The presumption that United
States law governs domestically but does not rule the world applies with particular force in patent
law.”).
43
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) [http://perma.cc/5X56JM6K].
44
Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195 (1856) (“The power [from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8]
thus granted is domestic in its character, and necessarily confined within the limits of the United States.
It confers no power on Congress to regulate commerce, or the vehicles of commerce, which belong to a
foreign nation, and occasionally visit our ports in their commercial pursuits”) [http://perma.cc/8JVLB3KV].
45
Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 441.
46
Id. at 441–42.
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for supplying components of a patented invention from the United States.47
The Supreme Court rejected AT&T’s theory and held that Microsoft was
not “supplying components” because only copies of Microsoft’s software
were being loaded into the computers.48 One important reason underlying
the Court’s decision was the presumption against the extraterritorial
application of U.S. patent laws.49 In short, the Supreme Court interpreted
U.S. patent law so that it would not encompass foreign activity even when
that activity stemmed from domestic conduct (i.e. supplying a master disk).
Although AT&T relied on § 271(f) to sue Microsoft, it could have just
as well pursued a worldwide causation theory. After all, Microsoft is based
in Redmond, Washington and develops much of its software there.
Presumably, Microsoft performed exhaustive tests on Windows loaded on
computers in the United States. Such testing would have been an infringing
“use” under § 271(a). Moreover, it was clearly foreseeable that successful
infringing tests would eventually lead to Microsoft’s foreign sales.
The fact that AT&T did not even raise the worldwide causation theory
is quite telling. First, it demonstrates that recovering extraterritorial
damages has not been part of patent law. Clearly, attorneys as capable as
AT&T’s would have raised the potentially lucrative worldwide causation
theory if the theory had been adopted previously. Second, AT&T’s
omission also suggests that the worldwide causation theory had a smaller
chance of success than the interpretation of § 271(f) that AT&T did
advance. The Supreme Court has said that Congress must provide a “clear
and certain signal” before expanding patent statutes wider than courts had
previously thought.50 AT&T was at least able to point to some statutory
language in § 271(f) that said that supplying components from the United
States was infringement. In contrast, the worldwide causation theory cannot
point to any statute that suggests that Congress intended to extend damages
extraterritorially. Indeed, Carnegie Mellon relied chiefly on Powell v. Home
Depot U.S.A., Inc., a decision that discusses reasonable royalty calculations
without discussing extraterritorial effects.51 Thus, like AT&T’s rejected
47

Id. at 442.
Id. at 453 (“Section 271(f) prohibits the supply of components ‘from the United States . . . in such
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components.’ Under this formulation, the very
components supplied from the United States, and not copies thereof, trigger § 271(f) liability when
combined abroad to form the patented invention at issue.” (emphasis in original)).
49
Id. at 454 (“Any doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls outside § 271(f)’s compass would be
resolved by the presumption against extraterritoriality.”).
50
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972).
51
See Plaintiff Carnegie Mellon University’s Opposition to Marvell’s Motion for Judgment as a
Matter of Law, New Trial and/or Remittitur with Respect to Damages at 4, Carnegie Mellon Univ. v.
Marvell Tech. Grp., Ltd., 986 F. Supp. 2d 574 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (No. 2:09-cv-00290-NBF), 2013 WL
3810532 (citing Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that
a jury may calculate royalties based on the benefit conferred)).
48
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interpretation of § 271(f), the worldwide causation theory attempts to
dramatically expand the extraterritorial reach of patent law in a way that
courts have not done before. But since there is no “clear and certain signal”
from Congress endorsing such an approach, the courts do not have the
discretion to adopt that theory now.
III. PUBLIC POLICY
A. Violating Principles of International Comity
The case against the worldwide causation theory does not rely on
doctrinal grounds alone. Such an expansion of U.S. patent law is troubling
from both international and domestic policy perspectives. Principles of
international comity suggest that the United States should not dictate how
other countries’ patent systems operate. Under the present international
patent regime, each country issues and enforces its own patents.52 Indeed,
the preamble of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) recognizes the need to provide for the “effective
and appropriate means for the enforcement of trade-related intellectual
property rights, taking into account differences in national legal systems.”53
If adopted, the worldwide causation theory would undermine the
international system of national patents and lead to a type of U.S. patent
imperialism. Many commentators (including this one) already believe that
U.S. law systematically overcompensates patentees.54 Not surprisingly,
other prominent foreign countries provide smaller monetary awards for
patent infringement.55 But the worldwide causation theory will allow
patentees to take advantage of U.S. patent law to avoid a foreign country’s
52

Martin J. Adelman, Shubha Ghosh, Amy Landers & Toshiko Takenaka, Global Issues in Patent
Law 1 (2011) (“A patent is a creature of national law, and an inventor seeking worldwide protection for
her creation would have to obtain a patent in every country that offers patent protection.”).
53
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299
(having 160 signatories) (emphasis added) [http://perma.cc/Z64T-T56T]; see also Holbrook,
Extraterritoriality, supra note 6 at 2160–61 (“Although TRIPS has afforded a certain level of
harmonization, it still grants flexibility for countries to afford higher protection or to exclude protection
for certain inventions.”).
54
See, e.g., Bernard Chao, The Case for Contribution in Patent Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 102–07
(2012) [http://perma.cc/NJ63-E2EY]; Brian J. Love, The Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a
Patent Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909 passim (2009) [http://perma.cc/VZ3B-QBYJ].
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Concepts, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 105, 139 (2003) [http://perma.cc/UYG2-J5SZ].

86

109:77 (2014)

Patent Imperialism

more limited remedies. In fact, companies will not even need to obtain
patent coverage in those countries. Companies will be able seek damages
based on U.S. law against products made and sold abroad by asserting U.S.
patents and suing in U.S. courts. This will be true even if the other country
has refused to award a patent for a particular invention and has consciously
chosen to provide more modest recoveries to those that are awarded patents
there.
Clearly, the United States would be extremely upset if the
circumstances were reversed and another country tried to impose its patent
values on products made and sold in the U.S. U.S. law may not match up
well with the patent law of other countries. For example, just recently, the
United States Supreme Court declared that many software patents are no
longer patent eligible.56 Imagine if Japan issued such a patent to a company
that used Japanese courts to recover damages on software designed in
Japan, but made and sold in the United States. The United States would
view this as impermissible interference with U.S. patent law. But that is just
what the Carnegie Mellon decision does in reverse; it allows U.S. patent
law to trump the patent laws of other countries for activity that takes place
in those countries.
This result would violate principles of comity that are already
embedded in U.S. law. The Supreme Court has said that statutes should be
interpreted to ensure that “potentially conflicting laws of different nations
work together in harmony.”57 In practice that means each nation should
“respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its
laws and their enforcement.”58 The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States Section 403(1) (1986) even suggests
that where there is jurisdiction, a state may not exercise that jurisdiction
unreasonably.59 Here, there is no good reason to substitute U.S. patent law
for the patent law of another country.60 In sum, the worldwide causation
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2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-go-ask-alice-what-can-you-patentafter-alice-v-cls-bank/ [http://perma.cc/33ZD-LSCU].
57
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theory leads to results that are inconsistent with basic notions of
international comity.
B. Harming Domestic Industry
Now of course the worldwide causation theory has limits to its
applicability. To invoke the theory, there must be some infringing activity
inside the United States that “causes” sales abroad. But this limitation
actually means that U.S. patent law will treat U.S.-based companies worse
than foreign companies. Typically, the domestic infringing activity will be
designing and testing products domestically or, as in the case of Marvell,
having the “sales cycle” take place within the United States.61 Such
activities are likely to be infringing “uses” under § 271(a). But if a
company’s research, development and “sales cycle” take place abroad, there
will be no domestic infringing activity that can be said to “cause” foreign
sales. Accordingly, foreign-based companies will be immune from U.S.
patent holders seeking to capture damages based on foreign sales.
This disparate treatment provides troubling incentives for companies
that conduct their affairs in the United States.62 Keep your key activities in
the United States and subject yourself to aggressive patent holders and
worldwide damages. Alternatively, move abroad and limit your liability
accordingly. Doubtless many companies will remain in the United States to
take advantage of its entrepreneurial ecosystem. But some companies are
already moving offshore for competitive reasons outside of patent law. For
example, semiconductor companies like Marvell have already offshored
much of their key activities. Most U.S. semiconductor companies now
manufacture their chips outside the United States.63 Some companies, like
Intel, have simply moved their manufacturing facilities abroad to take
advantage of lower-cost labor.64 Other companies, like Qualcomm,
Broadcom, and NVIDIA, have actually outsourced their manufacturing to
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Domestic Protections, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (2004) (discussing how differences in national intellectual
property rules can cause economic activity to shift from one jurisdiction to another)
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OFFSHORING REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06423.pdf (“The decline in U.S.
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semiconductor “foundries.”65 Since product companies generally assemble
their products abroad in countries like China, the semiconductor sales
usually take place abroad as well.66 Given a sufficiently hostile patent
environment, companies may well decide to move their research,
development and sales facilities offshore as well.67 There is precedent for
such patent law-motivated moves. In 2012, Microsoft moved its European
distribution center from Germany to the Netherlands rather than risk an
injunction in Germany that would affect its ability to serve other markets.68
The worldwide causation theory has the potential to have a similar
impact. In both Power Integrations and Carnegie Mellon, the theory
expanded damages drastically. In Power Integrations, there was evidence
suggesting that 18% of Fairchild’s semiconductor chips at issue found
themselves in products imported into the United States and 82% remained
abroad.69 If these numbers were correct, Power Integration stood to recover
over five times the lost profits it would have recovered under a more
traditional domestic-based damages theory.70
The worldwide causation theory had a similar impact on the Carnegie
Mellon result. The jury verdict of $1,169,140,271 was calculated using a
$.50/chip royalty on 2,338,280,542 chips.71 But apparently a large majority
of those chips were sold and used overseas. If damages had been calculated
based on the smaller United States royalty base, they would have ranged
from $164,648,899 to $278,406,045.50 reducing damages by 85.9% to
76.2%.72 Thus, to date, the worldwide causation theory has proven to
multiply damages several times. It is simply bad policy for the United
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States to force their own companies to endure such exposure when
companies with foreign facilities do not.
IV. CONCLUSION
Patent holders are pressing for an unprecedented expansion of U.S.
patent law by seeking to recover damages based on foreign sales. This
worldwide causation theory represents a dangerous turn that has the
potential to disrupt the international patent system and harm domestic
industry. Although the Federal Circuit has already rejected the theory once
in Power Integrations, Carnegie Mellon University was able to obtain an
unprecedented $1.17 billion verdict (now enhanced to $1.54 billion) relying
on this theory. The decision is currently being appealed. Relying on both
basic patent law doctrine and sound public policy, the Federal Circuit
should reverse the damages portion of that decision and quash the
worldwide causation theory for good. U.S. patent holders should not be able
to recover for damages for the sale of infringing products sold abroad.
Foreign damages should be left to the foreign courts enforcing foreign
patents.
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